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Abstract:
This paper considers the implications of silence and the ethics of medical experimentation in Paul 
Sayer’s Whitbread Prize-winning novel The Comforts of Madness. Sayer’s novel is concerned with 
a catatonic patient, Peter, who has attempted to withdraw into a state of pure subjectivity as a 
consequence of a series of traumatic events. Initially treated at a traditional hospital, he is subse-
quently moved to an experimental clinic where he is subjected to a series of invasive and barbaric 
“treatments” in the interest of “curing” him. Sayer’s approach to the topics of insanity, personal 
silence and progressive medicine raises questions concerning the right of the individual to reject the 
communal world, and the ethics of extracting the withheld narrative of the reluctant narrative. By 
examining the processes of normalisation and resistance, the novel raises questions concerning the 
ethics of enforced inclusivity and establishes a legitimacy of non-co-operation, a right to silence, 
which functions in parallel with the legitimacy of the marginalised voice. The recent trend in liter-
ary studies has been toward the exposure and promotion of those voices which have previously 
been ostracised by the publishing industry and the reading public, yet this process has generally 
functioned on the premise that the lost voice will benefit from such exposure. For Sayer, there is an 
equally persuasive case for recognising a right to privacy which is in danger of being overshadowed 
in an era of excessive transparency. This essay discusses the ways in which Sayer’s novel addresses 
these concerns, and highlights his awareness of the complex process of dealing with the individual 
for whom a refusal to speak is an ambiguous social gesture.
Keywords: Silence, marginality, medical ethics, social (in)visibility, trauma.
Resumo:
Este artigo considera as implicações do silêncio e da ética da experimentação médica no romance 
de Paul Sayer, The Comforts of Madness, vencedor do prémio Whitbread. O romance de Sayer 
debruça-se sobre um paciente emestado catatónico, Peter, o qual procura retirar-se para um estado 
de pura subjetividade como consequência de uma série de eventos traumáticos. Inicialmente tratado 
num hospital tradicional, é posteriormente transferido para uma clínica experimental onde é subme-
tido a uma série de «tratamento» invasivos e bárbaros com o objectivo de «curá-lo». A abordagem 
de Sayer dos temas relacionados com a insanidade, o silêncio pessoal e a medicina progressiva le-
vanta questões relativas ao direito do indivíduo de rejeitar o mundo comunitário e à ética de extrair 
a narrativa retida da narrativa relutante. Ao examinar os processos de normalização e resistência, 
o romance levanta questões relativamente à ética da inclusão forçada e estabelece uma legitimi-
dade de não-cooperação, o direito ao silêncio, o qual funciona em paralelo com a legitimidade da 
voz marginalizada. A tendência recente nos estudos literários tem sido no sentido da exposição e 
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promoção das vozes anteriormente ostracizadas pela indústria editorial e pelo público leitor, mas, 
de um modo geral, este processo tem partido da premissa de que a voz perdida beneficia de tal 
exposição. Para Sayer, existe o caso igualmente persuasivo relacionado com o reconhecimento do 
direito à privacidade, em risco de ser preterido numa era de transparência excessiva. Este ensaio 
discute o modo como o romance de Sayer aborda estas preocupações e salienta a sua consciência 
do processo complexo de lidar com o indivíduo para quem a recusa a falar corresponde a um gesto 
social ambíguo.
Palavras-chave: Silêncio, marginalidade, ética médica, (in)visibilidade social, trauma.
“Body is earth, territory of violent metamorphosis and substitution. We are all in peril of 
becoming thing. The grotesque gap between our humanity and this thing – the body killed, 
damaged, wounded – is held open by metaphors.”1
In an era when surveillance and exposition have reached unprecedented levels of 
accessibility and effectiveness, there is inevitably a question mark which hangs over 
the legitimacy of silence and invisibility. Should we have, or indeed grant, the right to 
withhold narrative, to remain silent even when the narrative concerned is seen to be of 
social or political value? As Lennard J Davis has observed, we “speak of silence as a 
form of political repression. We say that women’s voices have been silenced, and we 
correct that condition by calling for women to speak. Silence is seen as the prison-
house whose guards are language. The inhabitants of silence must break their bonds 
and let their words echo forth in freedom” (109-10). This vision of silence as a form of 
political disempowerment is commonplace in contemporary society, and carries with it 
a compulsion to liberate voices wherever silence is encountered. Yet equally, silence is 
frequently a potent means of taking refuge from communal exposure, allowing the private 
realm of individuality to remain private. The current obsession with exposure relies on 
the assumption that the liberated voice is somehow both therapeutic and empowering, an 
assumption which may emanate from the confessional box, but which establishes itself 
more forcefully with Freud’s talking cures, Janov’s primal scream, Spivak’s subaltern 
narratives, and even with the recent trend for childhood abuse narratives popularised by 
Dave Pelzer, Oprah Winfrey and others. Yet such extensive demand for exposure in the 
name of political and personal liberation has tended to overshadow an equally valuable 
vehicle of empowerment, the right to remain silent.
In his Whitbread Prize-winning novel The Comforts of Madness (1988), Paul Sayer 
examines the ethics of silence and privacy through the lens of a character for whom a 
1 Owen, Stephen, cited in Ledbetter, M., Victims and the Postmodern Narrative, p. 1 
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mental breakdown, caused by his inability to properly relate to, and subsequent fear of, 
the external world has brought about a near-complete withdrawal into an internal space of 
subjectivity. Sayer’s novel, highly praised at the time of publication but since neglected 
by both critics and the reading public, questions the ethics of enforced exposure in a 
medical context, but the implications of his text extend, I will argue, to the broader social 
realm, and also impact on the ethics of literature itself. In parallel with the obsession 
with visibility in the information age, the trend in literary studies has been, since the 
1960s, to pursue the lost narrative, to grant voice to the dispossessed, delegitimized and 
marginalised in order that such figures might too enjoy the benefits of cultural centrality. 
Coupled with this is a concern which is almost invariably overlooked, specifically the 
right of the marginal figure to remain in the margin, to maintain their invisibility through 
choice. The law, of course, is aware of and indeed observes, in some measure, the right 
of the suspected criminal, for example, to remain silent, yet in cultural terms this right is 
frequently problematized, not just within the realm of criminality, but also within those of 
difference and otherness, in which the demands of cultural curiosity tend to exceed those 
of privacy. 
Sayer’s novel, which addresses the issue of the right to privacy, highlights the 
complexity of the problem of extracting a resistant narrative from a reluctant source. The 
narrative is that of Peter, a catatonic mute suffering from a condition highly reminiscent 
of that which Jean-Dominique Bauby, in The Diving Bell and the Butterfly, terms “locked-
in syndrome” (12), caused in this instance not by a stroke, which triggered Bauby’s 
paralysis, but by a series of psychological traumas. The Comforts of Madness predates 
The Diving Bell and the Butterfly (1997) by almost a decade, yet the similarities in both 
the predicament of the narrator and the voice through which it is portrayed are striking, 
affording Sayer’s fictional text a credibility that, without Bauby’s autobiographical 
parallels, may have been left open to question. Both narratives incorporate a realist account 
of the circumstances of the paralysed hospital patient, interspersed with reminiscences 
from a non-paralysed past and recollected dreams which inevitably escalate in value as 
the distinction between waking and sleeping becomes increasingly unclear. The primary 
difference between the texts, I would argue, is one of intent; where Bauby’s text is the 
product of an irrepressible determination to communicate (described by AL Kennedy as 
“an almost inconceivable act of generosity” (Bauby, back cover)), Sayer’s is a narrative 
which is threatened with being drawn by force from a figure for whom mute paralysis is 
intended not as a prison but as a sanctuary. When Kennedy refers to an act of “generosity”, 
it is not without recognizing the potential desire of the incapacitated subject to withhold 
his or her narrative, to retain and build upon the opportunity for privacy which is lacking 
elsewhere in the social realm, particularly given that the paralyzed body, now wholly 
dependent on the attention of others, has in itself become an over-exposed object.
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Most narratives which deal with the mute or speech-impaired figure stress a desire 
to communicate which is overcome through any means available, however extreme or 
limited these alternative means may be. Christy Brown and Christopher Nolan, two 
celebrated Irish authors each with cerebral palsy, relied on speech therapy, limited motor 
skills and creative gesturing in order to communicate with the external world. Bauby, 
whose paralysis was so comprehensive that he could communicate only through blinking, 
employed a system of partner-assisted scanning through which even this most limited 
interface with the outside could produce a complex narrative of his inner experience. 
The persistence and innovation of these real-world figures stands as an indicator of 
the irrepressibility of the human voice even in the face of seemingly insurmountable 
constraints, each text they produced highlighting the desire to communicate even when 
the channels of communication are all but eradicated. They suggest, too, that a failure to 
communicate may not be a consequence of impossibility, but rather one of choice. In the 
case of the mute or paralysed figure who does not overcome the immediate obstacles in 
the way of communication, it is usually taken for granted that the desire to communicate 
is thwarted by circumstances beyond their control, but such an assumption fails to 
accommodate the possibility that there may, in fact, be no such desire in the first place. 
Sayer’s fictional character, in contrast to those who have fought to overcome their 
constraints, has effectively attempted to withdraw, or disappear, from the world. Although 
the retreat is purely psychological in origin, it has a profound impact upon his physical 
being, disabling his motor skills at even the most basic levels, rendering him entirely 
at the mercy of his carers. Externally, what remains is an inoperative body. Internally, 
however, Peter is aware, lucid, and ambivalent about his situation. On the one hand, he 
is frustrated by his loss of somatic control, seeing his body as a locked room to which he 
has a defective key. His situation is one which is met with indifference in the traditional 
institution in which he is initially kept as a patient, but which intrigues and challenges the 
more radical medical staff at the One World experimental treatment facility to which he is 
transferred, where he is viewed as a potentially valuable rehabilitative project. 
His is a particularly extreme case, one which demands a degree of scrutiny and in-
vasive experimentation which is wholly at odds with his own desire to retreat from the 
threatening attention of the outside world. Peter is assured that he will be treated ethically 
while at the clinic. “At One World”, he is told,
you will not be a ‘case’, no, you will be, first and absolutely foremost, a human 
being, a living, feeling, thinking man capable of all the sweetness and essence 
that is given to mankind. You will act for yourself, be able to shrug off the 
nightmare of your past. You need only have the simplest of faith in us and you 
will be rewarded. We can make you well again, but you must be prepared to 
make the greatest effort yourself. Work, Peter, work hard, and you will be whole 
once more. (26)
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This promise, though, is one based on a process of homogenisation (implied by the 
name of the clinic), which seeks to achieve “social realignment status” (53) for its pa-
tients. The quest to make the abnormal “well” and “whole” again is based on an assump-
tion that normality is by default a desirable outcome for the psychiatric patient. Tellingly, 
however, the first patient to achieve this status, while Peter is at the clinic, is sent home, 
but drowns herself in a canal before she gets there. As an indicator of the inverted status 
of the margin and the centre, through which the state of abnormality is preferable to that 
of enforced normality, the suicide is effective in highlighting the instability inherent in 
the notion that the achievement of conformity is necessarily desirable, and served too 
to examine the underlying remit of medical treatment – statistically she is regarded as a 
success for the clinic, while in human terms, she is clearly a victim of a process through 
which her secure identity (the invisibility she has achieved in the institution) is damaged 
irremediably. 
The ethics of treatment, rehabilitation and reintegration are addressed from a notably 
singular perspective in the novel, one which is essentially inaccessible in any form other 
than fiction. Written in the first person, The Comforts of Madness is, on one level, an 
attempt to recreate the narrative that exists not just inside a social margin (the psychiatric 
institution) but inside a narrower realm, a realm that, even within the margin, is margina-
lised. Peter, even by the standards of the other patients at the two institutions in which he 
is interred, is abnormal as a consequence of his profound silence and his lack of bodily 
control, thus shifting the definition of normality itself from an absolute to a relative value; 
even among the socially stigmatized, he is a marginal figure. Equally, it is an attempt to 
give voice to a narrative which, having by definition been defensively repressed, autono-
mously rather than through any external agency, does not attempt to counteract its margi-
nal status, but instead endeavours to maintain it as a positive attribute through which the 
relationship between the self and a hostile external environment (the objective world) is 
effectively severed.
In the text, the dynamics of the subject/object relationship are brought explicitly 
to the foreground, the premise being that Peter, having suffered a series of childhood 
traumas (including the mental breakdown, attempted suicide and eventual murder of 
his mother, and culminating in his witnessing of the slow, painful death of his father), 
has descended into the catatonic state. We are made aware that Peter has always been 
quiet; the implication is that the traumas represented in the text are a mere culmination of 
numerous earlier, unmentioned incidents that have forced him into a state of silence. As 
a consequence of these final, overwhelming events in his pre-catatonic existence, Peter 
withdraws irreversibly into himself; yet the self into which he attempts to relocate himself 
is not, as might be expected, the corporeal body, but rather a self devoid of physical 
presence, beyond any tangible location, existent but absent. In a move that attempts, 
unsuccessfully, to reject the phenomenological approach of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
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in which “abstract selfhood is seen as inseparable from being-in-the-world” (Shildrick 
49), in favour of a Cartesian bifurcation of mind and body, Peter takes the notion of the 
body as container and disrupts it, creating a narrative of the self in which the body is 
both a container and an unwanted addendum, unusable yet unshakable in its attachment, 
an abjected (in the Kristevan sense) manifestation of presence in a rejected external 
corporeality. 
As a consequence of his abandonment of bodily control, Peter’s identity as a legi-
timate, autonomous being has, to the external world, largely been negated, shifting his 
presence from active participant to passive observer not just of his environment, but of his 
own physical self; in his incomplete but partially-achieved attempt to separate mind from 
body, he has thus rescinded the possibility of meaningful interaction (including commu-
nication, at least within that field in which his body exists as an object). Yet in spite of 
his physical silence and seeming inability to communicate externally, Peter’s story does 
somehow manage to traverse the boundary between self and other. The existence of the 
narrative itself complicates the issue of bodily silence as an absolute blockage of commu-
nication; it is, like the narrative of the dead, an impossibly externalised text, yet unlike 
that of the dead, its first order of existence (as a subjective experience) is not inherently 
questionable. 
We are aware of the apparent impossibility of the existence of the narrative outside 
of Peter, owing to his inability to speak, write or communicate in any way other than 
through the involuntary emissions of his body, which offer the peripheral characters in 
the novel only the most minimal signs of his subjective presence. Even these emissions, 
with their basic, utilitarian messages, are problematic. In the heat of the hospital ward 
office, Peter becomes nauseous and acknowledges that “I would have to swallow my own 
vomit, perhaps choke to death on it there and then, for it would never come out” (21). 
The passing of faeces is similarly constrained: “I had fouled the bed, but it would not be 
much; I did not shit much, was never one for it” (7). These revelations, which convey both 
a sense of retention (particularly of those unpalatable emissions which include faeces, 
vomit and the repressed) and an indication of the candid narrative to which the reader is 
privy, highlight the fact that the reader is not just witness to a transcription of subjectivity, 
but to a realm traditionally considered socially taboo, surrounded by a cultural barrier that 
not only respects but also demands privacy; the process of mediation that converts the 
private self into the social self is, like the bathroom door, not only a means of shielding 
the individual from society, but also society from the individual. The voice that emerges, 
then, is not simply a candid confession; it is, in its openness, a voice that is at once purely 
a product of the self and entirely unself-conscious, challenging the recipient’s own sense 
of distance, the distance that is always maintained in a normal communal society with 
regard to emissions. 
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Here, though, the reader is granted access to the processes of Peter’s mind through a 
bypassing, rather than a penetration, of the physical boundaries; the very existence of the 
text is obscene, in as much as it is the narrative that cannot be observed from without, or 
brought into the open, even through force. This is the problem faced by each of Peter’s 
carers in turn, a problem tackled by treating Peter variously as a human being, an animal, 
an object, even appealing to his instinctually sexual being, without success. The text, 
conversely, reaches the reader without encountering such problems, without, seemingly, 
involving an act of violence or coercion. This form of narrative seems, superficially, to be 
necessary for the ethical re-empowerment of the silenced voice, the voice of the victim 
whose identity is annexed and isolated in the quest for a victimless visible society; yet it 
is infused with an ambiguity of purpose and a deeper potential for violation, one which 
Sayer is at pains to demonstrate. Mark Ledbetter suggests that: 
An ethic of writing is to discover and to make heard silenced voices; an ethic of 
reading is to hear those voices. No text, no human story, and there are few diffe-
rences between the two, is without victims. Yet the stories of the powerful have 
become so strongly loud that little short of moments physically and/or emotio-
nally violent and wounding allow silenced victims to speak above the imposing 
din we might aptly call the ‘master plot’ of most narratives. (Ledbetter 1-2)
The assertion that what is required in order to access the narrative of the silent “vic-
tim” is an act of violence (physical or emotional) is mirrored in Peter’s narrative through 
the attempts, both physical and emotional, to dissolve the boundaries both between the 
self and the other and between the conscious and unconscious (repressed) self. The ethics 
of the various techniques applied to Peter’s protective shell, along with the right to silence 
that seems conspicuously absent from Ledbetter’s argument, are discussed below, but for 
the moment, it is sufficient to consider the logic of this dissolution. The efforts to coax 
some trace of subjectivity from Peter range from the gently sympathetic (the efforts of 
another patient), through emotional blackmail (by the director of the One World rehabili-
tation centre, to which Peter is moved early in the novel, as an experimental case, whose 
reputation rests in part on his ability to ‘cure’ Peter), subliminal torture (the moisture-
-sensing pad in the bed that triggers, on registering Peter’s incontinence, an admonishing 
voice that he believes to be his own mother’s, trying to persuade him to take responsibi-
lity for his body), to the medically experimental (the introduction of illicit drugs that have 
the effect of forcing Peter’s muscles into action, the barbaric suspension machine that 
leaves Peter in a state of extreme physical peril in the hope that an introduced trauma in 
the present might be traded for the recollection of one from the past). It is this latter pro-
cess that prompts Peter’s recounting of the traumatic events that have led to his catatonia.
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Such practices function under the veil of patient care, yet they closely resemble what 
for Robert and Francesca Tummey, can be termed “iatrogenic abuse”2:
Abuse occurs in mental health care against the people served, through the staff, 
the systems, the care, the emphasis and the power. It may not be the purpose and 
it may be ‘dressed’ in a way that can be justified, but it does occur in the care 
delivered every day. The nature of such discussion can be a disturbing reminder 
of human depravity and capability. It also serves as stark evidence that ‘care’ 
does not always afford people protection or asylum, but can create and re-create 
the chilling experiences of abusive relationships that harm and deprive. (127)
This recreation of the traumatic event from which the patient has attempted to 
distance himself represents a primary theme in The Comforts of Madness, in which 
Peter has sought refuge in order to abandon his body, only for it to become subject to 
exactly the kinds of physical violence he was attempting to defend himself against. The 
tension between his absolute autonomy and his absolute political insignificance, causing 
an ambiguity regarding his rights and those of his carers, is brought vividly into the 
foreground as Peter is relocated from the public hospital to the private clinic:
I was cracking up. Certain of it. Why couldn’t they leave me alone? Renegades.
Cunts. I was not coming apart in the mental sense, that much I felt reasonably 
sure about. No, this was different. You see, bits of me were  breaking loose, 
shaking free inside, kidneys, heart, spleen, even my intestines, were all freeing 
themselves from their moorings, lifting their roots from the brittle shell of my 
body which seemed to want nothing to do with keeping its respective compo-
nents in place. That business of removing me from the hospital had taken its 
toll. They should have known better than to fool around with someone like me. 
What right had they? But then, what were my rights? (36)
Peter’s questioning of his own rights is indicative of an uncertainty regarding the 
ownership of his body; having relinquished his possession of it as far as is possible, it has 
become instead a troublesome object of uncertainty, only partially discarded by its owner 
and thus neither fully lost property nor litter. He himself is content to reduce his corporeality 
to a description in which the organic and inorganic are grotesquely interwoven (“Me. The 
stiff one, old clay boots with his clay head and his old clay balls, a scarcely breathing hotch-
potch of hair, skin and bone, who flexed not the smallest extremity, not even a toe, who lay 
all night like a corpse himself, who had not spoken a word in anyone’s living memory” (8)), 
breaking down the distinctions between the living and the dead, fusing the mineral with 
the biological, defiling the classificatory boundaries to create what Mary Douglas would 
immediately recognise as problematic, contaminating “dirt” (2).
2 Iatrogenic can be translated as physician-induced.
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Thus Peter’s body, with its “thanatophile appearance and demeanour” (10) (a “still 
life in bone, hair and awful flesh” (112)), becomes a corpse that cannot be disposed of, 
its constant reappearance proving troubling to both the hospital staff and to Peter himself. 
In the public hospital, it is an inconvenient occupier of space: “How badly they wanted 
me out of the way, out of the dormitory to some unused corner of the ward, or even 
some other part of this rambling hospital [...]. ‘What shall we do with him?’ asked one. 
‘We could put him outside,’ came the reply. ‘Or in the toilet. Anywhere. It doesn’t really 
matter’” (10). Peter’s body, it seems, is unmanageable, and thus less appealing than a 
properly uninhabited corpse.3 It is guilty of a passive responsibility, a responsibility that 
is rescinded only once the corpse has become officially vacant. Peter, though apparently 
absent, is still, nonetheless, his body’s moral occupier; Merleau-Ponty’s connection 
between subjectivity and corporeality has not been severed entirely. For Laura Tanner,
The threat that such a body [that of the terminally ill patient] poses can be 
framed, in Julia Kristeva’s terms, as the threat of the abject, of “death infecting 
life”. Materiality and corporeality emerge in Kristeva’s work as necessary con-
ditions of subjectivity which the subject must nonetheless disavow in order to 
preserve the illusion of stability, unity, wholeness. Although Kristeva defines 
the corpse as “the utmost of abjection”, the body of the person with terminal 
illness may function as even more of a threat; such a person often exhibits the 
bodily signs of impending death while yet resisting the inanimate coldness that 
helps us to classify the corpse as Other. (23)
For Peter, this inanimate coldness is not resisted; he is not fighting, unlike the typi-
cally ill figure, to maintain the life signs of his body but instead to abandon it, and so his 
physicality does become specifically corpse-like. The irony is that the effort made by Pe-
ter to withdraw from the external world has augmented his visibility, to the extent where 
his body no longer demands privacy or respect (as a container of a subjective being) but 
is instead an object that invites scrutiny; in abandoning his body, Peter has infused into it 
the potential to become a form of public property. He is still a threat, in Kristeva’s sense, 
but the threat is partially reconfigured by the issue of bodily ownership. The responses to 
this are manifold and contradictory; there are those who regard his silence as an indica-
tion of absence, and treat his body as pure object, without regard for the boundaries that 
are automatically established around the living. Conversely, there are those for whom 
Peter is still very much present, but for these, too, the barrier of privacy is (necessarily or 
otherwise) constantly transgressed. 
Indeed, it is the latter whose actions prove most controversial: the attempts to dissolve 
3  This is directly comparable to Bauby’s understanding of self-as-object: he suggests “a niche must be found 
for us, broken-winged birds, voiceless parrots, ravens of doom who have made our nest in a dead-end corri-
dor of the neurology department. Of course we spoil the view. I am all too conscious of the slight uneasiness 
we cause as, rigid and mute, we make our way through a group of more fortunate patients” (40).
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Peter’s self-imposed barriers are, unquestionably, barbaric (the emotional blackmail, the 
psychological torture, the monstrous machine that finally (with an “atrocity of pain” 
(101)) breaks through the barrier between his conscious and unconscious, though not his 
physical silence); it is with an understanding that what we are reading is readable only 
as a consequence of this barbarism that the reader approaches the narrative of the trauma 
itself. We are, then, reading a text that, subsequent to the physical torture, has been torn 
from Peter by force. The question of whether this barbarism is ultimately of benefit to 
Peter is left provocatively unresolved by Sayer; certainly it does not serve to reconcile 
Peter with his physical form, yet it does allow for the construction of the narrative that 
helps to externalise and thus negate his past. 
This negation is echoed when, in his final phase, he is visited by his sister, Alison, 
whose spoken recollections of their past serve to erase still further his identity. Speaking 
to the nurse at the end of their meeting, Alison denies that the person she has seen is her 
brother: “It’s not him”, she tells the nurse, “He may well be called Peter, but I’m afraid 
that is not my brother” (125). The denial of identity is effectively the point of termination; 
the dying, rotting piece of flesh she has visited is not, in any real sense, any longer her 
sibling. Yet it also marks the point at which Peter becomes fully divorced from the social 
world. The question of the next of kin taking responsibility for the wellbeing of the inca-
pacitated figure, and thus accepting a degree of sovereignty over that figure, is no longer 
relevant; Peter is now entirely within the control of the internal system of the institution, 
a system which has objectified Peter as an experimental project.  
The barbaric yet culturally legitimised attempts to extract Peter’s narrative serve to 
reinforce his identity as homo sacer, a key theme of Sayer’s critique of the health system. 
For Giorgio Agamben, homo sacer, the figure “situated at the intersection of a capacity to 
be killed and yet not sacrificed, outside both human and divine law” (73), is the banned 
figure, excluded from the social order and cast instead into a realm of exception, in which 
the normal rights of protection and welfare are erased. Andrew Norris, drawing upon this 
conceptual identity, finds a direct comparison with the death row prisoner given the op-
tion to become an object of experimentation in return for a potentially reduced sentence:
When, in the United States, men condemned to death have been offered the 
possibility of parole in exchange for ‘volunteering’ to undergo tests that could 
not be imposed upon those with full rights of citizenship, the reasoning was 
quite understandable, and even attractive in its economy and ‘fairness’. Given 
that the person has been condemned to die, he has essentially already lost his 
life. As far as the law is concerned his life is no longer his own, and in that sense 
he is a ‘living dead man’. Hence there will be no crime against him if his life is 
‘lost’ again. But neither will that death be the imposition of the death penalty. 
Indeed, it is precisely insofar as he awaits execution that he remains alive: his 
life remains only to be taken from him in the moment of punishment. Death in 
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the experiment thus reveals the paradoxes of death row as a sphere that delayed 
penalty makes possible, that of the threshold between life and death. (11)
The correlation between this description and the realm inhabited by the terminally 
ill patient is significant; the discrepancy (that the death penalty is a product of a political 
system while terminal illness is a natural occurrence), becomes largely irrelevant in light 
of the fact that both the death-row prisoner and the terminally ill figure are being offered 
the possibility of a reprieve in return for the abandonment of their bodily rights. For the 
death-row prisoner, there is some pretence of voluntary submission, yet for the patient 
(particularly the patient whose responsibility is considered to be diminished), such volun-
teering, however symbolic, is not an option. As Donna Reeve notes, 
once someone has been detained under the mental health act they can be subject 
to treatment; whilst there will be cases where this will be highly appropriate 
and/or desirable for the person in question, others will experience treatment 
which in other circumstances would be seen as a form of assault. It is at this 
point that a state of exception exists because these people find themselves in 
hospital, with greatly reduced civil rights and being forcibly ‘treated’. What 
would normally be considered abusive is allowed within this setting and pa-
tients can become homo sacer, subject to the ‘sovereign’ power of the doctors, 
social workers and other professionals who control their daily life, treatment 
and release date. (209)
Reeve’s unsettling recognition of the diminished rights of the hospital patient cor-
relates directly with Sayer’s portrayal of the voiceless psychiatric patient. If Peter is an 
extreme metaphor, one in which the voice is entirely absented from the real world, he is 
nonetheless symbolic of the figure for whom invasive “treatment” is inappropriate. By 
presenting a character who is literally without any means of communication, Sayer is im-
plicitly acknowledging the effective voicelessness of the patient whose needs are best met 
not by attempted cures, but by a respect for their right to withdraw from the communal 
world altogether to a realm in which their psychological or biological condition can be 
endured on its own, natural, terms. As an act of exposing the space of exception and its 
inhabitants, Sayer’s text engages with the social responsibility to interrogate the (often 
questionable) practices of the health care system (and, if the novel is read metaphorically, 
any system where autonomy is surrendered to an external sovereignty), while simulta-
neously challenging the concept of enforced exposure. 
Indeed, the juxtaposition of the two institutions in the novel highlights a broader cul-
tural shift from a state of ignorant indifference toward the voiceless other to one of intru-
sive interrogation. If the traditional hospital in which Peter is interred at the beginning and 
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the end of the text can be regarded as an inefficient and ineffectual space, characterised 
by its “patchy discipline, its superficial concerns for its own survival, its watery formality 
and poor standards, its inability to justify itself in the things that it did and the way that 
it did them” (44), it nonetheless offered an undignified but essentially non-intrusive tole-
rance of his condition. By contrast, the progressive environment of the One World clinic, 
which masquerades as a facilitator of empowering rehabilitation, is in fact revealed to be 
something reminiscent of a torture chamber, in which information is extracted through 
interrogation and the infliction of physical and psychological pain. When it emerges, 
Peter’s confession (his traumatic history) is revealed to be largely irrelevant, and indeed 
it is not necessarily of interest in itself to the doctors at One World. The details are less 
important than the symbolic act of confessing; the project for the One World staff is not 
to discover what Peter has to say, but simply to force him to speak. As Elaine Scarry notes 
of torture, “while the content of the prisoner’s answer is only sometimes important to the 
regime, the form of the answer, the fact of his answering, is always crucial” (29). The 
resounding irony of the novel is that, when it does emerge, the confession does not reach 
the staff at One World, or anyone else in Peter’s physical universe. It reaches only him, 
in the form of resurgent memories, and the reader, in the form of the telepathic narrative. 
For Peter, the re-emergence of the lost narrative is wholly undesirable; for the reader of 
the novel, however, there is a need to acknowledge a degree of complicity in the tortuous 
process through which the narrative has been extracted. Reading the repressed history of 
the dispossessed other is not, perhaps. 
The Comforts of Madness, then, is a narrative of Peter’s attempt to reduce himself, his 
presence in the world, to a purely subjective construct. It is a novel of pure voice, but also 
of a voice without a crucial resonance, a voice with content but without form. Reading 
the novel is an act of reading the mind, an act which, the reader is made constantly aware, 
is ethically ambiguous. At a time when the disenfranchised voice has become not just 
an object of cultural value, but of cultural necessity, the validity of extricating that voice 
from its silent refuge is placed under scrutiny by Sayer. The silence that defines Peter is 
a metaphor that extends beyond the locality of this specific trauma victim to a diverse 
body of people for whom trauma and silence, in varying degrees, are inextricably linked 
as a model of cause and effect. The question is not, as is currently fashionable, one of the 
logistics of exposing these lost narratives, but rather of the ethics of doing so. Is there a 
fundamental right to silence, and if so, what are the rights of the silent? Peter, in ques-
tioning his own rights, rights seemingly rescinded the moment he withdraws from the 
dialogic communal relationship, draws attention to the unclear and problematic allocation 
of autonomous choice to the liminal (neither living nor dead) individual. It is, indeed, 
only in death, toward which he drifts as the novel closes, that Peter becomes in any way 
re-empowered, reinforcing Sayer’s sceptical outlook on the future of a society obsessed 
with knowledge, power and an illusory project of granting a voice to the voiceless other.
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